Algorithmically Efficient Syntactic Characterization of Possibility Domains

We call domain any arbitrary subset of a Cartesian power of the set {0,1} when we think of it as reflecting abstract rationality restrictions on vectors of two-valued judgments on a number of issues. In Computational Social Choice Theory, and in particular in the theory of judgment aggregation, a domain is called a possibility domain if it admits a non-dictatorial aggregator, i.e. if for some k there exists a unanimous (idempotent) function F:D^k - > D which is not a projection function. We prove that a domain is a possibility domain if and only if there is a propositional formula of a certain syntactic form, sometimes called an integrity constraint, whose set of satisfying truth assignments, or models, comprise the domain. We call possibility integrity constraints the formulas of the specific syntactic type we define. Given a possibility domain D, we show how to construct a possibility integrity constraint for D efficiently, i.e, in polynomial time in the size of the domain. We also show how to distinguish formulas that are possibility integrity constraints in linear time in the size of the input formula. Finally, we prove the analogous results for local possibility domains, i.e. domains that admit an aggregator which is not a projection function, even when restricted to any given issue. Our result falls in the realm of classical results that give syntactic characterizations of logical relations that have certain closure properties, like e.g. the result that logical relations component-wise closed under logical AND are precisely the models of Horn formulas. However, our techniques draw from results in judgment aggregation theory as well from results about propositional formulas and logical relations

On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets

The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in natural ways. We examine their stability by focusing on the existence of Nash equilibria and envy-free assignments. We highlight the differences between these mechanisms and find that only some of them exhibit both notions of stability. This shows the importance of carefully picking the right mechanism to ensure stable outcomes in the presence of budgets.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Algorithmically efficient syntactic characterization of possibility domains

In the field of Judgment Aggregation, a domain, that is a subset of a Cartesian power of {0, 1}, is considered to reflect abstract rationality restrictions on vectors of two-valued judgments on a number of issues. We are interested in the ways we can aggregate the positions of a set of individuals, whose positions over each issue form vectors of the domain, by means of unanimous (idempotent) functions, whose output is again an element of the domain. Such functions are called non-dictatorial, when their output is not simply the positions of a single individual. Here, we consider domains admitting various kinds of non-dictatorial aggregators, which reflect various properties of majority aggregation: (locally) non-dictatorial, generalized dictatorships, anonymous, monotone, StrongDem and systematic. We show that interesting and, in some sense, democratic voting schemes are always provided by domains that can be described by propositional formulas of specific syntactic types we define. Furthermore, we show that we can efficiently recognize such formulas and that, given a domain, we can both efficiently check if it is described by such a formula and, in case it is, construct it. Our results fall in the realm of classical results concerning the syntactic characterization of domains with specific closure properties, like domains closed under logical AND which are the models of Horn formulas. The techniques we use to obtain our results draw from judgment aggregation as well as propositional logic and universal algebra.The first two authors’ research was partially supported by TIN2017-86727-C2-1-R, GRAMM. The research of the second author was carried out while visiting the Computer Science Department of the Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

The social cost of congestion games by imposing variable delays

© . This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/In this study, we describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism incurs no additional cost, in contrast to tolls that typically differ from the social cost as expressed in terms of delays.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets

The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in natural ways. We examine their stability by focusing on the existence of Nash equilibria and envy-free assignments. We highlight the differences between these mechanisms and find that only some of them exhibit both notions of stability. This shows the importance of carefully picking the right mechanism to ensure stable outcomes in the presence of budgets.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author’s final draft